G. A. Cohen seeks to "rescue" justice from, primarily, John Rawls. His challenge to •\awlsian philosophy is widely thought to be one of the most powerful we have. Cohen's writings on this topic over many years culminate in his densely argut:d volume, Rescuing Justice and Equality.
1 While no thorough evaluation is J)P\�ible here, I will tentatively defend Rawls, but with reservations. !{awls's reliance on the original position is at the heart of Cohen's critique, with Cohen charging that this method makes the principles of justice depend on non-moral facts in ways that are fundamentally misguided. Cohen pursues both rnetaethical and normative prongs of this attack, and I shall be looking at both. On Cohen's view, Rawls's employment of the original position rests on the erroneous assumption that the fundamental principles of justice are fact dependent and, moreover, it leads the content of the principles chosen there to be distorted by categories of non-moral fact that themselves have nothing to do with justice. He argues that both of these shortcomings reveal that the original position method generates a conception of justice that is mistaken because it is less egalitarian than it should be. I will refer to these as the critique of "fact-dependent foundations," and the critique of "justice as regulation." I will conclude, briefly, with a discussion of a third form of sensitivity to facts suggested but not developed by Cohen, namely the role that the original position method must give to morally bad facts.
I presume no prior familiarity with Cohen's ar g uments, though some familiarity with Rawls is taken for granted. The stage can briefly be set with a reminder of what I will call Rawls's original position method. sometimes follow Cohen in referring to it as Rawls's "constructivism." Rawls's seminal development of the argument from the original position stems from the following methodological proposal. Oftentime\, disagree ments about what is to be done can be narrowed or settled if the answer is to be provided by a procedure whose authority is less controver-;ial. We might not agree about which restaurant would be the best choice, and yet we might agree that this ought to be decided by voting after discussing it. We don't disagree about that procedure as intractably as we do about which choice would be correct (judged by some procedure-independet t �tand ard). Rawls proposes something similar for the case of disputes about the content of social justice: these disputes might be more tractable if we could devise a procedure (it is bound to be only hypothetical. but that would suffice) about which there is less (reasonable, at least) dispute, in the following respect: it might be seen as effectively designed so a� to �elect principles that serve people's interests impartially, when they are conceived as morally free and equal. If such a procedure favors certain views of the content of justice over others, this ought to weigh in favor of tho�e views as a form of evidence or support. It might give pause even to those who hold to their original views with more conviction than they can invest in the proposed procedure, perhaps leading them to appreciate the decency and seriousness with which their opponents' view can be supported. Surely, that would be something. Famously, Rawls develops an elaborate procedure to serve this role.
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Individuals are represented in this hypothetical original position by parties who are able to know all that science and good sense can tell us about how the competing principles would be likely to bear on certain fundamental "primary social goods." These parties will each prefer the principles that would do best for them, though they are, in their special original position office, not to concern themselves with the fate of the clients of the other choosers. However, the choosers are behind a "veil of ignorance": they are not to know which of the people in the real principle-governed society is their client. They naturally must consider the possibility that it might be anyone. Cohen's objections to this whole approach stem from the fact that the results are partly, but crucially, driven by the non-moral facts that the parties are aware of. As I have said, Cohen mounts three Jines of attack, to which I now turn. The fact that hitting will tend to have this effect is not a moral truth, but a non •noral fact derivable (if necessary) from physics, physiology, and psych ology. The moral wrongness rests on this non-moral fact in the following respt:ct: hitting people would be less wrong, or perhaps even permissible if, and then because, it did not hurt people. Cohen accepts this, of course. But he argues that all such fact-dependent moral principles rest, in their turn, on principles that are independent of the non-moral facts in question. In the case of the wrongness of hitting, the following principle seems to be implicated, and yet it is not dependent on non-moral facts about how hitting affects people:
ct-free foundations
Principle 2: It is wrong, except in special conditions, to hurt people. This is a deeper principle than (1) in the following sense: (2) grounds (1), and not vice versa. We wilJ not try to say exactly what this grounding relation is, but we can note a few features of it that indicate the sense in which (2) grounds, or underlies (1). Notice that (l)'s truth depends on (2)'s truth. If this were denied, it would be inexplicable why the fact that hitting hurts is stated as a fact upon which (l) depends. How could this fact support (1) unless it was normally wrong to hurt people, which is principle (2)? Citing the fact that hitting hurts as a basis for the wrongness of hitting e,idently presupposes, as an explanation, the wrongness of hurting. So (1) must be granted to rest on (2).
But (2) does not similarly rest on (1), of course. The wrongne,� of hurting does not rest or depend on any facts about whether hitting happem to hurt people. If hitting did not hurt people, then we would have less interc,t in the morality of hitting, but we are not now asking what moral principk� are of interest given the facts as they are. We are asking what thing� an. · right and wrong. So there is this asymmetrical relation of depth. We will mark these ostensibly deeper principles with higher numbers, as mea�ure� of incre;lsing depth. So (2) indicates more depth relative to (1).
So, the wrongness of hitting rests on the wrongness of hurting, but the wrongness of hurting does not rest on the wrongness of hitting. Principle (2), the principle about the wrongness of hurting, obtains independc:ntly of the facts that ground (1 ). But (2) might be thought in turn to rest on �ome other non-moral facts. In that case we would not yet have to accept that there are any fact-independent moral principles. Cohen's argument, how ever, contains two importantly different claims, one of which we have just seen an argument for:
This leaves open the possibility of an infinite stack of deeper principles, each of which depends on some facts, albeit owing to a deeper principle yet. But Cohen denies that this is so in his second claim, which is the Ultimate claim (of fact-independence): Every principle that depends on facts is grounded, directly or indirectly, in a principle that depends on no facts at all.
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Unless the ultimate claim is true, principle (2), which grounds the wrongness of hitting in the wrongness of hurting, might itself depend on some non-moral fact. It is not, as we saw, grounded in the fact that hitting hurts, so it would have to be some other fact. What might it be? There might be something deeper to say morally about what is wrong with hurting people, but we are asking whether it is wrong to hurt people owing to some non-moral facts. I cannot think of any plausible candidates, but even if there were such grounding facts, Cohen chal lenges us to recapitulate these questions at the next deeper level and to see if we can find grounding facts yet again. Cohen argues, from such examples, that this procedure will always eventually (and usually quite quickly, he thinks) terminate in a principle that does not rest on any 1<1n-moral facts at all. , .;ince it will figure importantly below, we want a handy name for Cohen's n', \·ement (in the manner of the "relative claim") from any fact-dependent pnnciple to a deeper, relatively fact-independent principle that explains the moral relevance of those facts. I will call this "unearthing" the deeper principle.
6 In asking what grounds the fact that hitting is wrong in virtue of hu,ting, we can unearth the deeper principle that hurting is wrong. Cohen hopes to use this strategy against the original position method.
.3 A formal objection: Cohen's unearthing strategy
As we have seen, Rawls argues that principles of social justice are
7 partly through engagement with non-moral facts. The ques tinn that guides the Rawlsian approach is how things would work out in practice, in certain ways, if the basic social structure met certain principles rather than others. "In practice" is not meant to tie the principles to all the expected contingencies of our world going forward. It idealizes in particular ways. For example, parties to the original position are to choose principles of justice on the assumption, clearly contrary to fact, that there would be, among other "favorable conditions," publicly recognized full compliance with the rules and norms of the basic structure. Still, the parties who are selecting the principles in the hypothesized choice situation will bring to bear their general knowledge of such non-moral facts as characteristic human motives and concerns, cognitive abilities, characteristic patterns of moral development, predictable strains in keeping certain commitments, not to mention the whole universe of facts about how nature itself operates.
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The derivation of the fundamental principles of social justice in the original position renders those principles dependent on, and explained partly by, the non-moral facts about people and nature that lead the parties to select them. Rawls is explicit about this. He writes, "There is no necessity to invoke theological or metaphysical doctrines to support these) principles ... Conceptions of justice must be justified by the wn,htions of our life as we know it or not at all."
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At this point, of course, we should bring to bear Cohen'1, strategy of unearthing the fact-independent principles that are alleged to ground Jny fact-dependent ones. If Rawls is right that the two principlel> of justice as fairness are grounded wholly or partly in the non-moral facts about the "conditions of our life as we know it," there must be, Cohen argue,, a deeper principle that explains the particular moral relevance of those facts. This would suffice to show, Cohen thinks, that the principles generatct.1 by the original position cannot be the fundamental principles of social justice: The normative force of Rawls's two principles would be explained by son1l , 1ore fundamental principle. one that does not depend on those facts. To get to the fundamental principle or principles, we must unearth them by scraping away the facts whose relevance is grounded by something deeper. Suppose Cohen's argument were conceded up to this point. It might l>eelll to undermine the original position as an appropriate way to generate or arrin:'. at the content of principles of social justice. And suppose a Rawlsian we1 c to acquiesce in the demand for further unearthing. She then reports on her findings:
The unearthed Raw/sian principle: The fundamental principle is thi:,. -institutions ought to meet principles, whatever they are, that would be chosen in the original position, with its sensitivity to the facts whatever they might be.
This principle is now independent of any of the facts that the original position brings to bear, just as the wrongness of hurting is independent of the fact that hitting hurts. It is the kind of grounding principle, possibly independent of any facts at all, that Cohen has urged us to seek.
Obviously, a key question is whether or not the unearthed Rawlsian principle would necessitate any revision of the content of Rawls's two prin ciples of justice. On the face of it, it seems that their content would remain exactly the same. And indeed. Cohen acknowledges this.
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Moreover, the unearthed principle also grounds the content of justice by grounding the exact same moral relevance of the facts of our life that Rawls had origmally maintained. It grounds the whole original position methodology und1.mged. It merely adds that in a certain sense, the famous two principles, whi� ·1 Jcpend on facts, are not fundamental because they are explained by a deq principle -the unearthed Rawlsian principle -which does not depend on the !acts. But this is uninformative normatively, and it leaves in place the grou'lding relation between the facts and the principles Rawls had alleged.
Cuhen �till has a complaint here. Let's call it a formal complaint, because it is a . omplaint about how Rawls formulates the theory, not about its norma tivl ,t1b�tance. (In that sense, we could also call it "metaethical.") Let's look mo: t· closely at the formal complaint before turning to a substantive com plai11t as well, but one quite independent of the unearthing strategy.
The unearthing move to the fact-independent principle is so simple that it d oes not appear to make any substantial difference in Rawls's theory at all. 1 1 Bur there is. first of all, an important metaethical lesson here, and Cohen is right to think it is philosophically significant. It is structurally similar to the po int (as I see it) of the famous Euth yp hro problem:
12 If "[i]t is wrong to murder" depends on the fact that God forbids murder, there is a deeper principle that does not depend on that fact about God, namely: "[i]t is wrong to di�obey God's will, whatever it might require." On the divine command view this principle is more fundamental than "it is wrong to murder," because it morally explains the force of that prohibition. Similar points can be made for any view according to which moral principles stem from the outcome of a certain specified agency or procedure of any kind. Such views ascribe a certain moral authority to the agency or procedure. It looks to be a deeper (maybe fundamental, maybe not) normative truth that they have that authority to begin with. And that deeper normative force or authority does not stem from or depend on what those agencies or procedures do or say at all. 1 3 The structure of Cohen's point, then, has an ancient resonance in a broadly Platonic cast of thought. Cohen believes that, in this way, he has identified a deep mt·u1ethical disagreement between himself and Rawls.
15 He believes that hb own view, in which the unearthed principle is the fundamental one, is in conflict with Rawls's view in which the original position-generated principh-\ are the fundamental principles of justice. I take Cohen to be arguing thal ll.1wls is committed to denying that moral principles are ultimately grountkd in fundamental fact-independent principles. This appears to be a md,ldhical disagreement in the sense that it is independent of disputes about what the content of moral requirements might be. So Cohen takes Rawl\ to be committed to a faulty (because fact-bound) metaethics.
There is a way of interpreting Rawls that would avoid any mdadhical tussle with Cohen, one hinted at in the quotation just above, in whid, R,1wls says, "There is no necessity to invoke theological or metaphysical doctrines to support [these] principles." This is importantly not the same as assertinf. the metaphysical view that there is no deeper grounding principle for the relevance ascribed to the facts in the original position method. Rawls says, instead, more modestly, that the metaphysics (and here, metaethics) is beside the point if we are interested in the content and justification of the principles of social justi..:e. Whether because God says so, or because there is a quasi-Platonic fact-free principle to this effect, Rawls may still assert that the principles of justice are justified by their appeal to the parties in the original position in light of the facts of human life. Nothing about what would be just is added by pointing to the unearthed fact-independent principle (whether God-given, Platonic, or otherwise) that says, simply: "Those are the principles of justice, justified by the original position argument which appeals to those very facts." The quoted passage from Rawls, "Conceptions of justice must be justified by the comli tions of our life as we know it or not at all." is no support for Cohen's evident suggestion that Rawls is metaethically committed against this kind of "rational intuitionism." Indeed, that very quotation could be read as an endorsement by Rawls of a fact-independent principle, one that can be unearthed, in Cohen's own fashion, in looking for further grounding for the method of the original position. That is, to say that principles of justice are to be justified by the facts of human life or not at all, is not to deny that there may be some deeper philosophical support for this very view.
16 Contrary to what ( :nhen argues, the original position method, in which principles are justified by facts, is not committed to denying that there is some fact-free basis for any such moral relevance of the facts in a deeper normative principle.
.4 A substantive objection: regulation and non-justice values
Coh1.:11 denies that the facts of human life rightfully play any role in deter mining the content of justice, and we will consider his arguments shortly, but thi� is neither implied by, nor does it imply, the unearthing point about fact frec: ndamental principles. We should have names for two separate issues about the relation of facts to principles. Cohen's unearthing strategy uncovers principles that do not rest on facts. This leaves entirely open whether those principles operate on facts. To say that principles operate on facts is to say that their normative implications vary in accordance with relevant variations in the facts. Consider, again, the unearthed Rawlsian principle. It says that the content of justice is given by principles chosen in the original position in light of the non-moral facts of human life and nature, whatever they might be. As we have seen, this principle does not rest on any facts, such as those of human nature. Rather, the principle grounds the moral significance of those facts. But this shows that the principle operates on certain non-moral facts. It gives them a certain moral significance. The principle's normative implications vary depending on facts about "the conditions of our life." Every normative principle operates on facts, by saying which facts have what kind of moral significance. If this is right, then the way to understand Cohen's substantive complaint about the original position method, as repre sented by the unearthed Rawlsian principle, must be that it operates on the wrong facts and/or that it operates on facts in the wrong way. Cohen's �ubstantive objection is that the original position method can be shown to mix questions of justice with other considerations, as if one were choosing rules of social regulation rather than (the real project at hand) trying to ascertain the true or genuine principles of justice. We might keep the issue clearer if we distinguish the formal objection from facts, which we discussed in the previous section, from this substantive objection from regulation. In a way, it is a coincidence that this second issue also happens to be about facts itself is simply laid ou( (PL, p. 104) . On the question of whether there is a deeper principle that explains how facts have the moral importance they are given in the original position method, I believe Rawls can and does stay neutral in affirming a "construethist conception" that is "political and not metaphysical" (Pl, p. 97).
allegedly playing too great a role. I believe we get a clearer view of Cohen's substantive worry if we refrain from continually casting it, as Cohen tends to do, as (to put it roughly) anti-fact. The crux of this point is that the Miginal position method wrongly assimilates principles of justice to rub of ,111:ial regulation.
The explicit distinction between rules of social regulation and principles of social justice is, as far as I know, original to Cohen and it is powerful. A precise account of rules of regulation is not needed in order to see the distinction Cohen is after.
17 It rests on the powerful observation that when we make choices, there are often reasons in place that count for or again�t certain alternatives. Rules of social regulation are things we choose or adopt, and we do so for certain reasons. Among the reasons to consider are rea�llll� of justice. Once adopted, rules of regulation bear on how certain things arc: to be done, sometimes in the form of laws, sometimes in less formal norms. Being normative in that way, they are easily confused with principle� of justice. But we do not choose principles of justice. Rather, they are among the considerations we consult in our choice of rules of regulation.
This important distinction allows that our convictions about social justice might include principles that we do not, on balance, have reason to adopt as rules of social regulation under the conditions we happen to face. Such regulatory reasoning might recommend adopting (in practice) rules with a different content from the principles of justice we have compelling reason to accept as a matter of conviction, and we will consider examples in the next section. Cohen argues that this dissonance can arise because among the great variety of considerations that will bear on the question of which rules to adopt, it will be relevant how one set of rules of regulation would work out in various respects -engaging values other than justice, such as efficiency or stability -as compared to an alternative set of rules.
Here is one interpretation of Cohen's line of thought:
The original position, with its regulatory reasoning, requires that the choice, by the parties, of principles be made in light of whatever might affect people's interests -effects stemming from the adoption of one or another set of rules. 2 Not just anything about how adopting certain rules affects individual interests is a consideration of justice. 1,1re, the original position's regulatory approach lets the choice of ,tes be determined by non-justice considerations, and so does not ly identify justice.
(To h, . lear, (3) does not say that the original position approach guarantees that hoice of principles will actually turn on non-justice considerations; it say, .it �uch considerations are included among the ones that will, taken togt r, determine the choice.) On one meaning of "a consideration of just•. �in premise (2)) this would be a puzzling complaint. In the original po� n 111cthod it would be fatally circular to have the choosers bring ideas of just' to their deliberations. The aim of the original position method is to un, 'and justice in terms of other ideas. A less puzzling interpretation of tht • ., 1plaint, and the one I believe Cohen intends, does not suggest that the part s ,hould employ the idea of justice. Rather, the objection is that some of the 1,iderations relevant to the parties' regulatory reasoning arise from val,,1., that are (so we philosophers determine) no part of justice.
Uf �nurse, the Rawlsian should flatly deny this. So we want to know what ar�t1111ent Cohen gives in support of this charge, and what can be said against it. We know that Cohen endorses an interpretation of distributive equality that differs from and conflicts with Rawls's with respect to a number of values and wnsiderations that might move the parties, but that is beside the point Cohen is focusing on. He denies that the stylized regulatory reasoning is suited to track or constitute justice in any case, whether or not it happened to select principles he (Cohen) endorses.
The polemical situation is similar to the one raised by Nozick in his early charge that the original position method is designed from the beginning in a way that is blind to the possibility that justice is simply whatever would result from free market exchanges under protection of a minimal state. As Cohen writes, "the original position also excludes a concern for how much one person gets compared with somebody else: what I get by comparison with others finds no representation within that position, and believers in the claim to justice of relational equality should therefore be as wary of the original positio n, as a criterion of justice, as Nozick is."
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There are two subtly different lines of objection to consider here. One is that the original position argument is, roughly, question begg ing by, in effect, premising its argument, whose conclusion rules out Nozickean entitlement theory and Cohen-style egalitarianism, on the assumption that they are false.
It is not clear, though, which side (putting Nozick and Cohen on one �ide, with Rawls on the other) is besl seen as begging the question. All sides .ire supposing for the sake of the present argument that Rawlsian premises do indeed entail the Rawlsian conclusion, thus ruling oul the other:.. And, as Nozick notices, 19 any good deductive argument will be logicall) valid, in which case no one who rejects the conclusion can consistently accept the premises. To show that the argument is question begging, then, llhl take more than showing that the premises logically entail the conclusiu11 . but neither Nozick nor Cohen rises to this challenge. And, in fact, they hnlh suggest that their doubt about the premises is based on and justifieJ by thdr own theories of justice. It is patently question begging, as an argumcn against the Rawlsian original position premises, to object on the grounds that those premises do not entail Cohen's or Nozick's preferred principles of jm,tice. What is needed by these critics is an argument against the original po:,ition which does not presume the truth of any particular account of justice A second line of objection by Cohen can be seen as taking this mure promising form, arguing that the original position involves the partic:.. in (hypothetically situated) regulatory reasoning, and that such reasoning is bound to introduce considerations that have nothing to do with justice as intuitively understood (and not assumed to be Cohen's egalitarianism ur anything like it). So the question becomes this: which of the consideratiom that must influence the parties to an original position can be persuasively shown by Cohen to be considerations that do not, intuitively, bear on social justice?
After all, here is the Rawlsian position, put into Cohen's terms, which he must argue against: principles of justice are properly identified with possible rules of social regulation that parties to an original position would choose behind a veil of ignorance and under certain idealizing assumptions such as full compliance.
Notice that even what Cohen casts as regulatory reasoning is itself a morally defined enterprise. The question of what rules of regulation we should have in our society is, surely, a moral question. For example, in answering this regulatory question presumably no one's interests should count more heavily than anyone else's, and this is for moral reasons. And, arguably, the sum of interest-satisfaction is not a morally significant quantity, since it does not represent the good of any agent at all, again a moral point. So thL' 011g nal position might seem to emerge as a good method for answering thi� n1or 11 question: which rules of regulation should we have for our society? Indu,, • ,11hen writes, Tl 1• • rl· sent charge is not a criticism of the particular device, that is, the ori1·. n.11 position, that Rawls employs to answer the question, namely, what rul \hould we choose, that the denizens of the original position an· :er ... Instead, I protest against the identification of the answer to th, 1uestion with the answer to the question "What is justice?"
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But · ,portantly, Rawls is not proposing the original position or the two prindples as answers to the latter question, for (at least) the reason that the part:,, .ire choosing under the false assumption of full compliance. Cohen ten1 1 to L' Xaggerate the regulatory character of the original position method in thi, way, and it is a distraction from his main point. For example, he often writv:-. of "identifying justice with optimal rules of regulation."
21 Rawls is certainly not asking what rules of regulation we should have in the real world. He is �·nquiring into what justice would be for this world. The parties, while they ,ire sometimes said to know all "general" facts -those that would not allow any of them to know which individual they will be -are actually fed at least one important factual falsehood, namely that there will be full compli ance with the chosen principles. For that reason, the resulting principles, if translated into social rules, would not be sure to serve their intended purpose in a world in which compliance was only partial. Thus the original position is neither intended nor suited to selecting good principles of regulation for any plausible society. It is not perspicuous to say, then, that the account identifi es optimal rules of regulation for a society with the principles of justice for that society. The original position identifies justice with appropriate rules for a certa in hypothetical scenario. Indeed, Rawls could perfectly well agree with Cohen that principles of justice are not the sort of things we get to choose.
Cohen's central point is not damaged by this clarification, however. fa· en with the idealization about full compliance, the parties are engaged in what we might call "regulatory reasoning," and this is where the issue lies. The hypothetical society they seek to regulate is an unrealistically compliant one, but nevertheless, by selecting principles for that societ y on the basis of what would best promote their interests the parties are (so Cohen argues) necessarily concerning themselves not only with considerations of justice, but also with non-justice considerations such as efficiency and stabilit, 1 hat is the more important charge, rather than the charge that Rawb th1, s that principles of justice are subject to real social choices, or that thl' ch ' :rs in the original position are selecting appropriate rules of regulatio real societies.
We should accept Cohen's argument here up to a point. It is ha1" ,lcny that such values as efficiency and stability will influence the partie, .:es. What remains disputable, then, is whether Cohen has strong ar� ·nts showing that these values are not considerations that bear on justin hen appears to believe that it is simply obvious. He writes, "I have ... askt-1 1 to agree ... with the ... overwhelmingly intuitive claim, that the sort� ,cts about practicality and feasibility that control the content of sound I of regulation do not affect the content of justice itself."
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He argu, ' : at , "Constructivism about justice lacks the conceptual resources to de1-�.
•be justifiable trade-offs between justice and other desiderata, becau<,� . ::. e desiderata (improperly) constrain what constructivism deems to be jusl ,,n but what we are looking for is an argument that justice is the sort of thillf-that should be balanced against practicality and efficiency rather than being the appropriate way of balancing them, as constructivism, with its regulah•ry reasoning, would hold. Cohen's argw11ent for this lies mainly in his discu�. ,1on of a number of problems of social policy or regulation, including the structure of tax rate schedules, the problem of differential care (roughly, moral hazard), and issues around publicity and stability.
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For reasons of space, I consider only the first two here, arguing that they do not succeed.
Tax brackets and exactness
Cohen argues that step-wise tax brackets are bound to be less than perfectly just, and yet they must be irresistible to a constructivist theory of justice for reasons of administrability. This puts daylight between the original position method and considerations of justice. How could the person whose property or income is greater than another person's by the single dollar that kicks him into the higher tax (or rate) owe, as a matter of justice, much more tax -not just a little more -than that other person, and yet owe exactly the same as 22 P p . 2i8-9. n P . 312. 24 Richard Arneson, by contrast to my reading. finds Cohen's "terminologicaln choice here to be undefended. Stt "Justice ls Not Equality." sign,1 dy rkher rate-mates? Of course, it might be impractical to spend va1>1 s I of public money to implement a highly refined tax schedule, and in that <:
,t ought not lo be done. That does not, however, make the step-wise tax r.tl 1s just a1> the more refi ned ones would be.
01' ' ,1rgues that the parties to the original position would not insist on an ext1\ y fi ne-grained tax schedule if it would be vastly more expensive than a mi ,ttely fine-grained schedule. This is because they will be sensitive to ho¼ 1 11�e extra resources might be used to benefit them in other ways. He tak,· iis to show that a constructivist method must be prepared to trade gre.,' ustice off against gains with respect to other values such as efficiency.
[) this objection really show that Rawls's original position method forces tht r I 1es to engage in regulatory reasoning? It is fair to ask to what extent th1 .�inal position addresses such things as tax rates at all. The answer is th.
• it mostly leaves tax rules aside as a subsidiary question about how the ba� · ,ocial structure could be brought to meet the difference principle (s1111 1ect to the other Rawlsian principles). So Rawls's view seems to be that ta>. r,1tes are not directly matters upon which justice takes a position. A given ta, r.ite is just in the purely procedural sense if it is the product of a just basic st1 dllure where legislators duly aim to maintain the structure's justice by rnnlorming it to the basic principles.
Cohen might reply that Rawls's original position argument forces him to deny that there is anything unjust about, say, taxing the poor at a higher rate than the rich, if that should turn out to be the most sensible policy all things considered. But, of course, it doesn't quite say that. It says that there would be nothing unjust about doing that so lon g as that scheme is part of a basic social 1-lructure that meets the difference principle and the other principles. Rawls could argue that no such tax system is remotely likely to meet that proviso, thus explaining the absurdity in the suggestion that it might be just. But some will agree with Cohen that this does not accommodate the deep intuition that some tax rates are unfair, even if there are other good reasons for adopting them, irrespective of their downstream effects on distribution.
Differential care
The case of what Cohen calls "differential care," similar to what is often called "moral hazard," is a second example he uses to support his view that Rawls's constructivist method in the original position incorporates values that have nothing to do with justice. He sketches an example, which I slightly simpli�· here. Suppose that there are two possible schemes SI and S2 for publicly compensating homeowners should storms damage their proper!\ l nder S l everyone gets fully compensated for any damage. However, sorn� ,'L'ople might rely on this program and reduce the amount of care they lake to prevent storm damage. When compensation is provided, this woulrl •,c•em to be unfair to homeowners who had, at their own expense, taken gn.:att'r Lare and minimized their property damage. To reduce that kind of unfainll·�s, we might prefer scheme S2, which requires anyone who claim� bend1h o bear the first $200 of repairs themselves. This provides people with an 111u·ntive not to skimp in their preparations in the hopes of being bailed out late•, thus reducing the unfairness produced by compensation under Sl. Of cour:,.e, the "deductible" in S2 is crude in that it is not scaled to each honlL',,,-mer's incentive. Therefore, there might remain homeowners who will still du little or nothing even though the first $200 will be their own respon\.\-.1. lity, calculating that their preventive costs would be considerably more that, their expected compensation (the amount in excess of $200 multiplied by the probability of its occurring, say). Finally, suppose that while we could, at great expense, determine just how conscientiously each homeowner prepared her house for storms, and thereby tailor compensation so as to avoid such tree riding, 25 this scheme, S3, would be very expensive. To recap: Sl compemates for damages with no deductible, S2 compensates but with a $200 deductiblt' to discourage skimping, and S3 expensively compensates each, partly according to how thoroughly she prepared. Cohen argues that, (a) if there are free riders, S3 would be the most just, but (b) the original position approach to justice, with its reliance on regulatory reasoning, would, if S3 is expensive enough, select S2. The Rawlsian method, then, trades off justice against non-justice values such as efficiency.
S3's allegedly greater justice seems to presuppose that unequal outcomes are only just if they reflect factors for which individuals are responsible.
26 I t might look as though Cohen's argument here assumes that "luck egalitarian" standard of justice, indicting the original position method on the grounds that it doesn't select that principle. That would be question begging in a dispute about whether justice truly has that content. But there is another way of reading Cohen's complaint against constructivism, namely as asserting only that to count against a policy the fact that it would be very expensive is to give weight to a consideration -total expense -that is not an ingredient of justice at all, but a different value altogether. The original position method's reliance on re.:u!atory reasoning evidently selects for less expensive options other thi111 ' qual, and ii thereby disqualifies itself as a reliable method for dell, •iing the content of justice. To avoid the question-begging form of argu , · nt, we must be willing to grant -whether or not we accept luck egafit,11 ,tnism -that the overall expense of an arrangement does not count agaif l -· its justice.
It 1111ght be asked how we supposedly know that a scheme's overall expense is n<•! ,rny part of its justice? Grant that parties to the original position would, otlw· · hings equal, disprefer an arrangement that is more expensive. Can we infr. I hat the original position set-up forces Rawls to be indifferent to conl\'arative benefits? Supposing that we were to grant to Cohen that social ju�tk!.\ whatever more precisely it is, cannot be completely indifferent to comparative benefits, that would be damning. Surely we cannot infer it, though, since the parties in the original position might give some weight to int' quality and also some weight to aggregate benefit -overall cost Cohen tells u:-. lhat he rejects the view, "that distributive justice doesn't have a compara tive ,1spect at all. And as long as it (at least also) does so, then [constructi vism's sensitivity to the non-comparative issue of efficiency] will be (at least) in one way a deviation from justice."
27 That is a dubious argument, which rt·,embles the following fallacious reasoning: a crust is an aspect of what it is to be a pie. So pumpkin pie, by including pumpkin, which contains no crust, deviates from pie-ness "(at least) in one way." The fact that a certain consider ation (such as Pareto efficiency or overall cost) is not a comparative consider ation does not establish that an account in which it is one consideration among others is not comparative.
It is worth noting that Cohen eschews, without explanation, the name "moral hazard," for the issue he calls "differential care," even though in earlier drafts of the book he did use the more familiar name.
28 One possible explan ation leads us into an important issue. The term "moral hazard" suggests that when certain protective policies induce reduced care or increased risk-taking this operates by way of some moral defi ciency on the part of those who reduce their care or take greater risks. Cohen points out, however, that while some reduced care might be intended to exploit the care of others, this needn't be the case. Some people might reduce their care in response to the protective policy without any intention of exploiting others, and so there needn't be anr element of moral defect, but simply a an economic calculation. An alternative explanation is that strictly speaking, the familiar problem of moral h -.r d is not about "differential care" -some exercising less care than other, at all, but about some or all (maybe even equally) reducing their care in res1 11�e to the policy, still with the clear implication that their doing so is a 1 ,ral" wrong. In any case, we can see that Cohen wishes to focus on thl ·�c of differentially reduced care, and without the assumption that it is I ally wrong. His point, as we have seen, is that even if no one is morally n11 h·hav ing, a policy that leads to such differentially reduced care will be Lil ! ur to those who reduce their care less or not at all, even though it might ,. the appropriate policy in light of the costs of fairer policies.
Summarizing, the differential care example of Cohen's might shr,,\ .hat Rawlsian constructivism will tend to trade off equality of a luck egal· ? •an kind for the sake of efficiency (less overall cost). But that doe�n't sho,, ;hat this deviates from justice unless it is question-beggingly assumed that 1u ,tice is luck egalitarian in content. The simpler point that the original po� ,111 method will be sensitive to overall expense, or to Pareto efficiency ( wh1 h is not a comparative consideration), shows neither that justice is essenti.11ly comparative in nature, nor that, even if it is, constructivism is indifk1 lT to (other) comparative considerations.
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7 Bad facts
We have seen two ways in which Cohen criticizes the original position method for bowing to facts. The first was his formal objection that Rawls fails to recognize that facts are only morally relevant owing to principb that determine their relevance. Call this his objection to Rawls's reliance, in a certain way, on facts as such. The second and independent complaint was that the original position bends its results to facts that have nothing to do with social justice, facts concerning such things as efficiency or stability. Call this his complaint about constructivism's reliance on facts irrelevant to justice.
In his treatment of the case of differential care, we glimpse a third kind of complaint about reliance on facts, but one that Cohen does not clearly demarcate as different from the other two. Repeatedly, as I will illustrate, Cohen rhetorically leverages the moral deficiency represented by some of the 2 Q Space preve � ts cons _ i � eration of Coh � n·s treatment of stability and publicity. His argument that the ongmal pos1t1on method deviates from justice succeeds overall if it succeeds in any of these cases. fa, t to which constructivism bends its results. Call this a complaint about cc, 1,Lr 1ctivism's reliance on badfacts.
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J n !i�cussing the differential care case discussed above, he observes that l'he root cause ... that induces a compromise with justice in the "exploiter" .. ,riant of the differential care phenomenon is a certain human moral ··,f1rmity: Constructivists are, therefore, in the questionable position that they must defer to facts of human moral infirmity in the determination of ,vhat fundamental (nonrectificatory) justice is.
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Cohen .1cknowledges that under full justice-compliance, which Rawls assumes to be in place, there might not be any exploitation, but only innocent differen tial �are. Even if there is no exploitation, there might be reasonable fear of l • t loitation, which he says is enough for his purposes. And yet he continues t, ·11ppose that ''moral infirmity" might well be part of the differential care rrnfi le: "It would be transparently wrong to say that the facts about moral I\ ,·,1knesses and so on make S2 just (without qualification), as opposed to more worthy of selection."
32
It might have seemed from the very beginning that Cohen objected to the original position's sensitivity to, in particular, bad facts. He complained that if t.1lented citizens decide to withhold socially productive labor unless they are paid more than others, the original position will lead to the conclusion that justice requires paying them more even though such a demand seems to put them outside the publicly shared sense of justice. To that extent, they look bad. But Cohen never quite embraced this route. Even in the earliest setting, he did not complain that justice is being bent to accommodate bad behavior, but complained, more obliquely, only that in that case the talented would not count as in "justificatory community" with the other citizens -quite a different point.
33 And true to form, in the much later treatment of differential care in Rescuin g , he refers only glancingly to the inadequacy of "moral weaknesses and so on" (emphasis added) to qualify the original position's results as just. He does not make clear whether the original position is disqualified partly by the fact that its results are bent to make tht: best out 30 I briefly discuss a part of this question in "Human Nature," pp. 225ff. 31 P. 309.
32 P.3ll. 33 "Incentives, Inequality. and Community," pp. 263-329. There. he says thJt the original position "generates an argument for inequality that r�quires a modd of societ y in breach of an elementary condition of community " (p. 268).
